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Abstract
Social networking sites (SNS) such as Facebook have created a new way for individuals to
share personal data and interact with each other on the Internet. The disclosure of this
personal data is directly tied to the existing relationships of individuals within an SNS.
Individual privacy settings allow a selective disclosure of personal data to specific connected
individuals. In this paper, we present first empirical insights of a grounded theory study,
based on 37 qualitative interviews with Facebook users, which reveal factors that drive, or
generally influence, the use of these individual privacy settings on SNS. By investigating this
privacy protection behavior towards connected individuals, so-called â friendsâ in
Facebookâ s terminology, we add new perspectives to existing theories of information
privacy protection â individualsâ privacy protection behavior in nonanonymous online
environments. We have developed a conceptual model showing that the motivation to use
individual privacy settings depends on a complex interplay between different factors. As
important drivers, motives for using SNS, existing relationships and context of personal data
disclosure have been identified. Building on those insights further allows development or
improvement of general privacy controls for individuals interacting with each other on the
Internet.
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ALL FRIENDS ARE EQUAL – SOME EVEN MORE: AN INVESTIGATION OF
PRIVACY PROTECTION AMONG FACEBOOK USERS
Abstract
Individual privacy settings enable members of social networking sites (SNS) to share
specific personal data with selected parts of their contact network. This allows members sharing
even more private data they would otherwise not want to share with all of their contacts.
Although various privacy aspects have already been discussed in different disciplines, literature
still lacks insights on how members protect their privacy towards different kinds of SNS
contacts. Against this background we raise the research question why and how members set up
individual privacy settings on SNS. We draw our results from a grounded theory study based on
37 semi-structured interviews and two focus group workshops with 41 participants. The results
allow the extension of theories on members’ privacy protection, particularly on privacy
protection behavior in non-anonymous online environments. Furthermore, the results provide a
basis for improving the design of existing privacy controls on SNS and further application areas.
INTRODUCTION
As people increasingly accomplish many facets of daily life online – both in work and in
private (Boyd and Ellison, 2007; Davies 1997; Ellison et al., 2007) – it is becoming ever more
important to understand the determinants of this behavior and its effects on information privacy
(Belanger and Crossler, 2011; Viswanath et al., 2009). Even though the issue of privacy has been
discussed and described in different disciplines for decades, research on information privacy in
online settings is still an emerging field (Holvast 2009). Moreover, although the literature on
information privacy behavior is rich, many theories and concepts in the body of knowledge are
normative or purely descriptive (Smith et al., 2011; Xu et al., 2011).
Despite the fact that researchers have studied how individuals act with regard to privacy
for decades and what users’ concerns for information privacy are, the research results are
fragmented and usually discipline-specific; with concepts and theories that are inconsistent and
neither fully-developed nor empirically validated (Xu et. al., 2011). In particular, there have been
very few studies that have considered privacy at the small group level as demonstrated by social
networking sites (SNS, Beer, 2008) such as Facebook or Twitter, in which information
boundaries are created in groups of various sizes and relationship levels; this entails questions
such as whether and how limited-access groups differ from open access groups in their
information norms and practices, or what differences exist in actual changes of privacy behavior
(Smith et al., 2011).
Given the widespread adoption of SNS and the increasing public scrutiny surrounding
privacy on the Internet, it is surprising that little empirical data has been collected on the privacy
practices of SNS users (Lewis et al., 2008). The goal of the research reported here was to
investigate the privacy preferences and the privacy behavior of members of online SNS. We
analyzed the behavior of users of Facebook as one of the largest and most popular SNS regarding
their privacy protection towards other connected members, so-called connected ‘friends’.
Specifically, we examined the preferences of users regarding their individual privacy settings –
those privacy settings that enable SNS members to share specific personal data and activities
with specific contacts. For example, members might share a private photo with some contacts
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while they hide it from others. Against this background, we raise the following research
question: Why and how do members of SNS form individual privacy settings?
As theory is fragmented, we have chosen an exploratory research approach, following the
grounded theory methodology (GTM, Corbin and Strauss, 2008). Without the need for predefined hypotheses, the GTM approach allows us to consider aspects and relations that have not
or only to some degree been considered in previous literature. In the next section, we provide the
theoretical background and the related work of our study. Following this, we describe our
research approach and design. Afterwards, we present our analysis and empirical findings. We
discuss the implications of our results before we conclude the paper and give an outlook on
further research.

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
Privacy and Information Privacy in Online Settings
Although different facets and elements of privacy can be distinguished as shown by
Solove (2006) in a well-known taxonomy, privacy is and most likely will remain a diverse
concept. Following Belanger et al., (2002), we understand privacy as the ability to control and
manage information about oneself. The right of individuals for privacy is indispensable and
undisputed in the development of modern societies that are based upon personal freedom and
democracy (Westin 1967). The rise of the so-called ‘information society’ and increasing
participation of individuals on the Internet has shifted the focus of research attention to
information privacy in online settings (Davies, 1997).
The literature on information privacy is rich and covers various topics and levels of
analysis (Belanger and Crossler, 2011; Smith et al., 2011). One stream of the literature
specifically addresses the benefits of information privacy (Smith et al., 2011). It mainly takes on
the consumers’ perspective, those who are trading privacy in exchange for benefits such as
financial rewards and personalization. Other researchers highlight the importance of taking a
more interdisciplinary lens on information privacy, for example, incorporating a business and
marketing perspective (Pavlou, 2011). The need for a consumer-centric view of information
privacy is amplified by the rise of data-centric businesses such as Google and Facebook, whose
revenue models rely on the availability of personal data.
Furthermore, information privacy research on an individual’s level of analysis can be
approached from two perspectives. In the first perspective, to which we refer to as the individualto-organization perspective, the interactions between individuals as consumers and organizations
as providers of services are investigated. For example, Son and Kim (2008) investigate
individuals’ reactions on privacy threats originating from online businesses in general. Malhotra
et al., (2004) and Pavlou et al., (2007) focus particularly on the e-commerce domain. The second
perspective, to which we refer to as the individual-to-individual perspective, comprises
information privacy literature focusing on the interaction between individuals in online settings.
This stream of literature comprises different kinds of computer-mediated social interactions.
Here, examples can be found in the collaborative work and learning domain (Kreijns et al., 2003;
Wasko and Faraj, 2005), and particularly in the growing amount of literature on SNS (Boyd and
Ellison, 2007; Rosenblum, 2007, Strater and Lipford, 2008). With the rise of Web 2.0
technologies and social media, both perspectives on information privacy – the individual-toorganization and the individual-to-individual perspective – increasingly converge. For example,
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Dwyer et al., (2007) describe individuals’ information sharing and be-friending activities on SNS
as a function of general privacy concerns, trust in the SNS (individual-to-organization
perspective), and trust in other members of the SNS (individual-to-individual perspective).
Both perspectives on individuals’ personal data show that privacy has an influence on the
success of online business models relying on personal data and their interaction with individuals.
Regarding this individual-to-organization perspective, issues of information privacy can reduce
the adoption and usage of services. For example, an extension of Davis et al.,’s (1989)
technology acceptance model shows that privacy and risk perceptions determine the use of IT
and online services (Cazier et al., 2007). From the individual-to-individual perspective, issues of
information privacy and privacy protection behavior affect the diffusion of information between
individuals. This diffusion is essential, for example, in the context of viral marketing, where
individuals are not purely considered to be consumers of advertisements, but also to act as
distributors (Bampo et al., 2008; Porter and Golan, 2006). Consequently, understanding and
supporting individuals’ data sharing and protection behavior is a relevant aspect for
organizations whose online business model is based on this personal data of individuals.

Privacy Protection Behavior on Social Networking Sites
As a result, privacy and personal data sharing behavior on SNS are analyzed from both
business and privacy perspectives. Whereas for businesses, the main role of SNS as distributors
of content and advertisements is investigated (Parameswaran and Whinston, 2007), several
privacy protection aspects of personal data sharing and promoting behavior have been
researched. For example, data diffusion on SNS is determined by the topology of its member
networks as well as the individual characteristics of ties connecting members (Bakshy et al.,
2012; Granovetter, 1973). Those ties between members can be described by different attributes
such as the intimacy, intensity, and duration of occurring communication, or based on the social
distance between their members (Gilbert and Karahalios, 2009).
In addition, literature on individuals’ privacy protection behavior and literature on
members’ information consumption preferences expose a complex set of underlying reasons that
determine the behavior of individuals on SNS. Such reasons vary among individuals and their
corresponding motivation to use SNS (Joinson, 2008; Krasnova et al., 2008). For example,
Acquisti and Grossklargs (2005) and Acquisti and Gross (2006) generally describe the
complexity of privacy decision behavior on SNS, while Utz and Kramer (2009) highlight this
aspect particularly with respect to the activities of members on SNS.
Furthermore, this stream of literature is also rich regarding contributions to information
filtering and recommender systems (Adomavicius and Tuzhilin, 2005; Hanani et al., 2001). For
example, knowledge of the interaction behavior of SNS members is often used to extract relevant
posted contents from a members’ network in order to aggregate it in the form of a personalized
SNS newsfeed for an individual member; relevance in this context is mainly based on measuring
the interaction of members with certain contents (e.g., regularly commented posts could indicate
a higher relevance of their content for members). However, this ignores the fact that members
could also be interested in content without someone having interacted with it beforehand
(Backstrom et al., 2011; Bakshy et al., 2012; Taylor, 2011). Specifically, the role of privacy
controls has been proposed as a major line of research for investigating tie strength of individuals
connected with one another on SNS (Gilbert and Karahalios, 2009).
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Individual Privacy Settings on Social Networking Sites
SNS such as Facebook have created a new way for individuals to share personal data. A
large part of the activities of SNS members are driven by the characteristics of relationships
between individuals on SNS – such as the network of friends on Facebook (Stutzman and
Duffield, 2010). For example, several studies have shown that the majority of SNS members
shares personal data to only specific groups of SNS contacts rather than disclosing it to
everybody in their network (Taraszow et al., 2010; Utz and Kramer, 2009; Young and QuanHaase, 2009).
Contact networks on SNS can include people that stand in different relations to an
individual (Gilbert and Karahalios, 2009; Hangal et al., 2010). For decades, sociologists have
investigated the different roles individuals can adopt in their life (e.g., the role of an individual in
a work, social or family context). Individuals adapt a certain behavior, which they consider
appropriate in a given context (Goffman, 1959; Wellman and Worteley, 1990). Individual
privacy settings on SNS allow addressing this need of an individual to act in different roles in an
online setting. For example, Facebook members can freely set up groups of contacts (e.g., close
friends, school mates, colleagues, or acquaintances) in order to allow individuals to act
differently for each group (e.g., to share only certain and different personal data in each group).
Consequently, individual privacy settings of members influence the data diffusion on SNS on a
micro- and tie-specific level (e.g., from an individual member perspective). However, the role
and application of privacy settings has been investigated mainly on a general level, focusing on
the differences between friends, friends-of-friends, and members that are in no relation to the
individual (Boyd and Hargittai, 2010). A more differentiated understanding of individuals’
privacy protection behavior on a micro-level is needed, considering the different social
relationships universally referred to as ‘friends’ (Hangal et al., 2010; Houghton and Joinson,
2010).
The application of individual privacy settings determines the way data diffuses among
SNS members and thus in the network as a whole. Providing these members with appropriate
means to differentiate between different kinds of contacts is essential to keep their privacy
protected and to allow them a high level of activity – i.e. active sharing of personal data (Van
den Berg and Leenes, 2010). Thus, understanding why and how SNS members use individual
privacy settings is an important aspect for SNS providers in order to establish and maintain a
successful business model.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The objective of this study is to provide a more differentiated understanding about
individuals’ actions and behavior as means of privacy protection in small group online settings.
Thereby, we focus especially on (a) the individual-to-individual level and (b) on non-anonymous
online environments such as SNS. We aim to uncover individuals’ motivations, experiences,
preferences, and actions in dealing with their most immediate audience on SNS: their network of
contacts (network of ‘friends’ on Facebook). Thereby, we extend and connect theories on
individuals’ privacy protection behavior on SNS, sociological theories of behavior within groups
and communities, and aspects of social network analysis.
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We follow a qualitative research approach based on GTM (Corbin and Strauss, 2008).
This allows us to consider facets that have not or only to some degree been considered in
previous literature. Our investigation is focused on Facebook as the world’s largest SNS. We
decided in favor of Facebook for the following three reasons: (1) Facebook offers a large variety
of personal data sharing functionalities and privacy protection mechanisms, especially in
comparison to competing SNS (Bonneau and Preibusch, 2009; also documented at
http:/blog.facebook.com/), (2) Facebook is one of the largest SNS in the number of users
(HowManyAreThere.net, 2012), and (3) Facebook has become economically significant and has,
compared to other SNS, a large socio-economic impact on society (Qualman, 2011).
Data Collection
We collected our data using several techniques. First, we conducted 37 semi-structured
interviews with Facebook users that took place between March and June 2011. We used an
interview guideline to maintain the interview flow in interviewee-directed interaction, asking for
examples and trying to get to specific situations or events. The interview guideline was not
shared with interviewees and was only used as a general outline, with lots of room for deviations
and probing questions. The first part of the interview guideline consisted of questions helping us
to describe each interviewee’s usage and privacy protection behavior on Facebook. Besides
demographic questions, questions of the first part of the guideline focused on:
 the frequency of usage in terms of log-ins;
 the interviewee’s original motivation to join Facebook;
 whether and which data is shared;
 with whom data is shared (all Facebook members, friends-of-friends, friends, sub-groups of
friends, or specific single friends);
 size and composition of the interviewee’s contact network (e.g., how many distinct groups
such as colleagues, school mates, close friends, and so forth can be identified in the
interviewee’s contact network);
 other SNS applications the interviewee is using besides Facebook and the purpose for using
these SNS;
The second part of the interview guideline consisted of questions helping us to understand why
interviewees show this particular behavior on Facebook. Exemplary questions are questions on:
 privacy awareness of the interviewee as regards Facebook (e.g., whether the interviewee
experienced, heard, or read about problems and bad consequences resulting from using
Facebook);
 general privacy awareness of the interviewee (e.g., whether the interviewee in general tries to
avoid disclosing personal data online or whether personal data is disclosed if a sufficient
benefit can be expected);
 perceived trust and attitude of the interviewee as regards the SNS provider Facebook and
other, associated third party services (e.g., whether interviewees consider Facebook to be
trustworthy);
 relationships towards different sub-groups in the interviewee’s contact network (i.e., the
interviewee’s motivation to include a specific sub-group in their network of contacts;
answers range from “just staying in touch” to specific kinds of interactions with other subgroups);
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the interest in news and activities of sub-group members (e.g., which kind of information is
interesting from contacts with whom interviewees intend to just stay in touch vs. activities
and news of other sub-group members);

Our data collection strategy was open and based on random sampling, as we strived for
analytical generalizability. We aimed to reach diversity of interviewees, particularly with regard
to part one of the interview guideline (Facebook usage and data protection behavior). The sample
comprises interviewees of different nationalities in the Western World, but with a focus on
German interviewees (25 Germans, 4 British, 3 Americans, 2 Finns, 1 Canadian, 1 Italian, 1
Dutch). The interviewees range in age between 15 to 47 years, with 26 male and 11 female
interviewees. The total experience with Facebook ranges between a few days and five years,
whereas the interviewees’ networks of contacts on Facebook vary between 11 to 1,581 contacts.
In the second part of the study we organized two focus group workshops with 41 participants.
Figure 1 depicts an overview about the whole set of study participants. It includes the
participants of the semi-structured interviews as well as the participants of the focus group
workshops.

Gender dist ribution

Age dist ribution
40

Number of participants

Number of participants

60
50
40
30
20
10
0
male

25
20

15
10
5
0

female

15-20

Year of Facebook regist ration

20

16
14

12
10
8

6
4

2
0
2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

20-25

25-30

35-40

40-50

Size of cont act net work

18

Number of participants

Number of participants

35
30

16

14
12

10
8
6
4
2
0

2011

Figure 1. Participant structure
The interviews were conducted in three rounds. As literature indicates a potential bias in
individuals’ replies to privacy-related questions (Braunstein et al., 2011), we collected our first
slice of data using Facebook channels on the Internet Relay Chat (IRC). IRC provides a tool for
(anonymous) group communication, private messaging, and file exchange. It is divided into
different networks that host thousands of chat rooms on a diversity of topics (Simpson, 2000).
7
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We have chosen IRC as our first source of data collection in order to preserve anonymity of the
interviewees and to create the first valid analytical benchmark for subsequent face-to-face
interviews. We conducted 13 semi-structured interviews from March to April 2011 via private
conversations on the IRC. The chat protocols extracted from the IRC sum up to 46 pages of text.
Following this, we performed 24 face-to-face interviews with Facebook users in two rounds to
collect the second and third slices of data. The interviews took place between April and June
2011. On average, each face-to-face interview lasted about 30 minutes. The interviews have been
audio-recorded and transcribed, resulting in 220 transcript pages of text.
Two focus group workshops were organized based on the World Café workshop
technique (Brown and Isaacs, 2005). The workshops took place in December 2011 and in April
2012. A World Café workshop aims to combine collected knowledge of all participants on a
topic of mutual interest. The participants spread around a number of tables. A specific question
or proposition is discussed at each table, moderated by one of the participants. Each participant is
invited to share thoughts and opinions with the other participants and to note them down on a
paper tablecloth. After 20 minutes, all participants except the moderators switch tables and go on
with discussing another question on another table. This iterative process can achieve a deep
understanding about the topic of interest. At the end, all moderators give a summary of results,
which is discussed by all participants. Besides the summaries of the moderators and the
discussions with the participants, we collected 23 square meters of paper tablecloth with
brainstorming-like thoughts and comments on the according questions.
Data Analysis
Data collection and data analysis were conducted in parallel. That is, we analyzed and
discussed the collected data already in between the three rounds of semi-structured interviews
and the two rounds of World Café workshops. Thereby we compared new data with concepts and
categories that emerged from previous rounds of data collection in order to spot potential
contradictions and to extend the evolving theoretical concepts accordingly. Following this
iterative cycle of constant comparison allowed us to keep the results of our analysis in line and
consistent with the collected data (Corbin and Strauss, 2008). Furthermore, the data collected in
the World Café workshops confirmed the results from the analysis of the semi-structured
interviews, with no additional categories or concepts having occurred. Therefore, we jointly
concluded that theoretical saturation had been reached (Guest et al., 2006).
GTM is a qualitative approach that uses a systematic set of procedures to develop an
inductively derived theory about a phenomenon (Corbin and Strauss, 2008). Data analysis is
conducted using three different coding procedures: open coding, axial coding, and selective
coding (Corbin and Strauss, 2008). The process of data analysis was clustered into these three
parts and was supported by the software program MaxQDA. First, in the process of open coding,
we analyzed the collected data for recurring patterns, ideas, and concepts. In a next step of
abstraction (selective coding), we identified important concepts serving as categories, other
concepts representing properties of these categories, and further concepts representing
dimensions of these properties. We used mind-mapping techniques that allowed us to arrange
and connect the single concepts in a hierarchical and contextual order. In the third step of the
analysis (axial coding), we specifically analyzed the data with a focus on passages defining and
explaining relationships between the categories, their properties, and their dimensions.
In the next section, we present these categories and summarize them as well as their
relationships in the form of a specific set of propositions. Together, the concepts and their
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relationships form a conceptual model that is presented at the end of the next section. Following
the procedures of GTM, our findings are grounded in the collected data. During selective coding,
we identified constructs relationships between the higher-order categories that were identified
during the open coding phase. By doing this, we selected our core categories and systematically
related them to other categories, validating those relationships and filling in categories that need
further refinement and development during axial coding (Corbin and Strauss, 2008). The results
are presented in the following and are complemented with exemplary data (i.e., statements of the
interviewees).

ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
Existing literature on SNS indicates that the reason for individuals to become members of
an SNS and their resulting behavior on that SNS platform is individual for each member
(Joinson, 2008; Krasnova et al., 2008). Our collected data also supports this fact. In the process
of selective coding, five categories emerged that capture and describe these individual
differences between members. Furthermore, they provide the foundation for explaining (1) why
members apply individual privacy settings and (2) how members configure these individual
privacy settings. For each identified category, the implications on the leading questions why and
how members use individual privacy settings on SNS are summarized in the form of
propositions.
Why SNS Members Apply Individual Privacy Settings
Reason to Connect
In terms of members’ reason to use an SNS, our collected data proves to be consistent
with the corresponding SNS literature (Joinson, 2008; Krasnova et al., 2008). Members
distinguish each other from one another regarding their reason to use an SNS and in the way they
are connected with their network of contacts (see related work). In addition to that, we noted that
members’ reason to connect with other SNS members can either be the same for their whole
contact network or may vary for specific groups in that contact network:
 Same reason for all contacts in the network: The members’ reason to be connected is the
same for each contact in their network. For example, Interviewee Oliver1 reports: “My main
intention to use Facebook is to keep in touch. I don’t use the SNS for regular
communication”. The same holds for other members who use the network more actively,
e.g. to create a certain image of themselves for all of their contacts. For example,
interviewee Neal stated: “… the purpose of personal profiles is to create a picture of you for
others. I did that for example by filling in my favorite books and movies… I saw other
profiles including educational background, career histories and other things people seemed
to be proud of.”
 Different reasons for specific groups of contacts: Several interviewees mentioned having
different reasons to be connected with specific groups of contacts in their network. An
example of this is interviewee Adele, reporting: “On Facebook I share nearly everything
with my best friends, like in real life. However, other Facebook friends like colleagues or

1

All names of interviewees in this paper are pseudonyms.

9

Sprouts - http://sprouts.aisnet.org/12-17

people I met during my studies or on holidays I mainly want to stay in touch. I don’t want to
share everything with them.”
From the reasons why members connect with contacts of their network, we can conclude that
they either treat all of their contacts in the same manner or differentiate between specific groups
of their network. Consequently, we propose:
Proposition 1: Members in SNS primarily distinguish between different groups of contacts
because of different reasons for being connected with those contacts.
Level of Activity
The statements of interviewees Oliver, Neal, and Adele in the previous section already
indicated what has been observed across the whole sample of collected data: SNS members show
different levels of activity when using an SNS. This level of activity varies in intensity of SNS
usage, ranging from ‘rarely’ (few times per year) to ‘regularly’ (several times per day). But even
more important for this study is the members’ level of activity regarding the disclosure of
personal data. It varies between being either passive or active, based on the different reasons
members have to connect:
 Passive (low level of activity): All interviewees stated to use Facebook as a medium to be
socially-informed and entertained: “Reading the newsfeed is like reading a newspaper, it
keeps me up-to-date and many things I forget immediately …” (Interviewee Ralph). We
consider a member’s behavior on SNS as passive if personal data sharing activities are
scarce. For instance, Interviewee Oliver’s behavior for keeping connected results in a low
level of activity. Also Adele’s behavior towards her colleagues or holiday acquaintances
implies a low level of activity (cf. above).
 Active (high level of activity): While all members stated using the SNS for consuming
content, their level of activity varies from ‘almost never’ to ‘regularly’. Interviewees share
personal data to inform others about themselves, about things they care about, or to give and
to receive socially related feedback: “Maybe I post status updates and other things to
receive sympathy. I mean if I personally like a link I can enjoy it on my own. I post the link
so that others say ‘this link is cool’.” (Interviewee Steve).
Consequently, the varying reasons of SNS members to connect go hand in hand with different
levels of activity. Whereas keeping in touch and informed is typically considered a passive way
of using an SNS (low level of activity), motivations like presenting oneself to contacts or
receiving socially-related feedback requires a more active contribution (higher level of activity).
We conclude:
Proposition 2: Different reasons of members to use SNS lead to different levels of activities.
Regarding the use of individual privacy settings, we noted that SNS members with an overall
low level of activity have little reason to distinguish between their contacts. An example is
interviewee Oliver who, as mentioned above, mainly uses an SNS to keep connected with other
members. We suggest:
Proposition 3: An overall low level of activity makes it obsolete to distinguish between different
groups of contacts by means of individual privacy settings.
Inhibitors
10

Sprouts - http://sprouts.aisnet.org/12-17

Several times we noted that SNS members referred to different reasons hindering them to
use the SNS in a more active way. These inhibitors, as we refer to them, usually relate to aspects
of members’ privacy. Either members are afraid of being able to protect their privacy
appropriately or that it would require simply too much effort for them. We identified the
following types of inhibitors that in general prevent members showing a higher level of activity
on SNS:
 Mistrust of provider (Facebook): Many interviewees report having a general low level of
activity because they do not trust the platform provider Facebook: “I don’t trust Facebook,
it sells information. It goes into your contact lists and asks for everything. It wants to know
where you work and where you graduated from, how much money you make. All information
is collected in one spot.” (Interviewee Hope).
 Reliability of privacy protection mechanisms: Interviewees stated having reduced their level
of activity (i.e. active contribution) because they do not trust the reliability of privacy
protection mechanisms that are provided by Facebook: “I don’t use these privacy settings
because they change these settings so often. I limit what I put on Facebook.” (Interviewee
Ian). Another reason reported by several interviewees denotes the complexity of privacy
protection mechanisms and the related issue whether members are capable of using these
privacy controls in an appropriate manner to achieve the desired outcome: “Recently I was
tagged on a photo and friends of mine made fun out of it. I found this strange as I thought I
had disabled tagging. Sometimes you cannot control what happens.” (Interviewee Taylor).
 Effort to protect privacy: It is well-known by the interviewees that protecting privacy on a
contact-to-contact level by means of individual privacy settings is a complex endeavor. For
example, interviewee Wendy reported: “It took me quite some time to understand how to
configure the access rights for different parts of my friends network […] I had to read and
browse through many of these privacy setting menus”. Not everybody is willing to take this
much effort; many interviewees reportedly react to this by reducing their level of activity.
An example of this behavior is interviewee Garry, who limits his level of activity by
carefully selecting his network of friends: “I like this function but I’m not using it, I’m just
too lazy. I don’t add people I don’t like.”
In summary, many interviewees would like to be more active, but mistrust Facebook as a
platform provider, do not perceive its privacy protection mechanisms as reliable, or consider the
effort to protect their privacy as too high. All these factors ultimately inhibit their level of
activity, which leads us to conclude:
Proposition 4: Individual privacy considerations (mistrust of the provider, reliability of privacy
protection mechanisms, and effort to use individual privacy settings) reduce members’ level of
activity.
Consequences of Privacy Threats from Contact Networks
Individual privacy settings allow SNS members to control the disclosure of personal data
towards different contacts or groups of contacts in their network and thereby allow members to
treat the latter differently or individually (see propositions 1 and 2). We asked the interviewees
for their reasons or need to actually treat specific groups of contacts differently. We identified
two different types of consequences, which members are afraid of if they are not using individual
privacy settings, to distinguish between the recipients of their contributions: (a) misinterpretation
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or unintended interpretation and (b) misuse or unintended use of personal data shared on an SNS
platform:
 Misinterpretation or unintended interpretation: The first possible consequence and, at the
same time, the key motivation of SNS members to distinguish between contacts is to avoid
misinterpretation or unintended interpretation of shared personal data. Most interviewees
consider this the most important inadvertent consequence, which can occur in their own
network of contacts: “What other people think about me is important to me. I read the
newsfeed regularly and this determines how I think about others – especially of those I have
not seen for a longer time. When I met them again I noticed several times, that my
impression of them was completely wrong. Maybe this is because Facebook displays only
some information. I don’t like to get a wrong impression of others but it would be worse if
others got a wrong impression of me.” (Interviewee Quentin). On a general level, we
identified two reasons responsible for this worry. First, misinterpretations or unintended
interpretations may be caused by incomplete information about a member, since shared
personal data or activity might only reflect an extract of that member’s life: “The party
photos I posted there represent just a small part of my life. However, as most of my photos
on Facebook are party photos one could assume partying is a major part of my life.”
(Interviewee Steve). The second reason for misinterpretation or unintended interpretation is
potentially misleading personal data, such as irony, sarcasm or insider jokes: “I’ve got a
special kind of humor. Sometimes I post absolute nonsense just for fun. Outsiders who don’t
know me and just read this might think I’m an idiot.” (Interviewee Taylor).
 Misuse or unintended use: This second privacy threat was mentioned only in four cases.
These interviewees reported that their shared personal data had been misused or used in an
unintended way. One of these cases was described by interviewee Dorotha, who stated: “I
restricted access for some of my friends because when I met my new boyfriend one girl was
trying to make things hard for me”. The prevalent opinion among interviewees regarding
threats of misuse is expressed by interviewee Hans, who states: “I think people I’ve added
or accepted as friends are trustworthy. They won’t misuse my data.”
In summary, our data shows that individuals mainly distinguish between different groups of
contacts within their contact network to avoid wrong or unintended interpretations of their data.
Avoiding misuse or unintended use of personal data is an additional motivation to apply
individual privacy settings. Nevertheless, SNS members seek to minimize this kind of
consequence mainly by limiting access towards their contact network. We propose:
Proposition 5: Individual privacy settings allow members to share different personal data and
show different levels of activity towards different parts of their contact network. The key
motivation for this is to avoid threats of misinterpretation or unintended interpretation.
Figure 2 documents the actual application of privacy settings of participants, including the
interviewees as well as the participants of the World Café workshop participants. It shows that
nearly 90 percent of our participants restrict access to at least some of their disclosed data to their
contact network. In addition, 45 percent of our participants at least occasionally apply individual
privacy settings to specific personal data.
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Figure 2. Most restrictive privacy settings of the participants

How SNS Members Apply Individual Privacy Settings
Composition of Contact Networks: Our interviewees’ networks of contacts can be
differentiated based on two factors: size and composition. The smallest size of a network which
an interviewee reported consisted of 11 contacts, whereas the largest network was comprised of
1,581 contacts. The composition of members’ contact network turns out to have an important
impact on their privacy protection behavior. This raises the question of how many groups and
which kinds of them an SNS member needs to distinguish to feel his or her privacy protected.
We identified two main types of groups. These groups can be distinguished from one another in
the way their members are interconnected with each other (i.e. their structure):
 Small world network groups: Following existing literature on social network analysis
(Granovetter, 1973, Watts, 2003), we consider groups of contacts in which members are
tightly interconnected with each other as “small world network groups”. For example,
member A is connected with the members B, C, and D whereas B, C and D are also
connected with each other. Thereby, several of such groups, which occur in our empirical
data, can be considered as those “small world network groups” (e.g. ‘family members’,
‘sport club members’, ‘school mates’, ‘colleagues’, or ‘former colleagues’).
 Unconnected groups: “Unconnected groups” are considered to be groups of contacts within
a member’s network that are not interconnected with one another. For example, member A
is connected with member B, C and D, but B, C and D are not connected with one another.
Unconnected groups describe a type of group that has been mentioned by the interviewees
and does not show the characteristics of a small world network group (e.g. ‘acquaintances’,
‘barely known’ or ‘nearly strangers’).
Most often, small world network groups pointed to a specific context of a members’ life (e.g.,
colleagues at work) while unconnected groups rather display a personal relationship (e.g.,
acquaintances). In addition, contacts of a member can also be part of more than one group. For
instance, a contact can be in the sport club as well as in the school mates group of a certain
member. Furthermore, a sport club contact can also be an acquaintance of that member. We
therefore suggest:
Proposition 6: Groups of contacts within networks of contacts differentiate from one another in
their structure – in particular whether the contacts in these groups are interconnected or not.
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We make this distinction between groups intentionally explicit as our collected data has shown
that these group types directly determine the way members apply individual privacy settings.
While the interviewees do not hesitate to differentiate between unconnected contacts, some
interviewees reported to have difficulties applying individual privacy settings to differentiate
between contacts that are part of a small world network group. Ellison et al., (2006) describe that
individuals participate in SNS to build up social capital, which refers to network ties that are
characterized by goodwill, mutual support, social trust, and mutual obligation (Huysman and
Wulf, 2004). Potential loss of such social capital seems to be at least one of the reasons why
members avoid distinguishing in-between a small world network group of contacts. For example,
interviewee Neal reported: “This has the potential to destroy friendships. At least it could cause
severe discussions in the sense ‘why did you hide this from me while A can see it?’ For me this
would be worse than for example the case where my personal data is sold to a marketing
agency.” We conclude:
Proposition 7: Members tend to avoid applying individual privacy settings to different contacts
within small world network groups of contacts to avoid loss of social capital.
Interpersonal Ties – Characteristics of SNS Relationships
Based upon the different groups of contacts reported by the interviewees, we investigated
the characteristics of ties between the interviewees and their contacts on a tie-specific level. We
asked questions such as “Imagine you would have to write down a description of each of your
contacts, including everything you know about this contact. How would these descriptions differ
from one another for different contacts?” or the other way around: “Imagine each of your
contacts would have to write a description of you, including everything you think the contact
knows about you. How would these descriptions look like and how would they differ from one
another?” We particularly linked the answers to those questions to the different groups of
contacts that the interviewees had mentioned before. For example, we asked them how the
potential descriptions of such members would differ for a close friend and an acquaintance – or
from sport club members and colleagues.
The answers to these and further questions allowed us to consider several dimensions of
interpersonal ties as described by Gilbert and Karahalios (2009, see brackets). For example, the
reports of the interviewees showed that the provided contact descriptions typically differ from
one another in length (dimensions ‘intensity’ and ‘duration’), amount of personal or confidential
information (dimensions ‘intimacy’ and ‘emotional support’) and in topic (dimensions
‘structural’ and ‘services’). Scrutinizing the answers along these dimensions, two facets of
interpersonal ties turned out to be particularly important to determine how members distinguish
between groups of contacts within their network and how they define individual privacy settings:
contextual relation and personal relation.
First, contextual relation refers to different kinds of commonalities that a member shares
with a given contact. Following Dey et al., (2001), we consider context as any information that
describes an SNS members’ situation in their life. All interviewees could place each of their
contacts in specific parts of their personal life, which again can be represented by different
context dimensions:
 Leisure context, for example, ‘application members’, ‘sport club members’, ‘party
acquaintances’ or ‘holiday acquaintances’.
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Location context, for example, ‘neighbors’, ‘people from the place where I live’, ‘people
from the place where I grew up’.
 Educational context, for example, ‘university’, ‘bachelor studies’, ‘master studies’, ‘school’,
‘primary school’, ‘secondary school’, ‘semester abroad friends’.
 Professional context, for example, ‘colleagues’, ‘former colleagues’, ‘colleagues at the
same hierarchy’, ‘superiors’.
 Social context, for example, ‘family’, ‘common friends’, ‘partner’s friends’.
The examples of the different context dimensions above represent the groups of contacts the
interviewees have mentioned and to which they have a particular reason to be connected. Most of
these groups show the characteristics of small world network groups – ‘holiday acquaintances’
and ‘party acquaintances’ might be an exception here, though. However, we identified no small
world network group whose focus and origin was not associated to one of these context
dimensions. We propose:
Proposition 8: Small world network groups of contacts usually originate from and refer to a
specific context of members’ lives.
Our collected data indicates the existence of a contextual relation between a contact and the
personal data a member shares with this contact. Members disclose personal data in a contextspecific way to their contacts. An example of this is interviewee Taylor who reports that “being
tagged on a photo is not a problem, I mean if my friends can see it. Many of them have been at
the party as well … they know how it was.” A contextual relation implies that the contact has
sufficient background information about the shared personal data (e.g., because the contact was
together with Taylor at that party). Consequently, he or she will not interpret the data in a wrong
or unintended way. We suggest:
Proposition 9: Members share personal data in a context-specific way. This means, they share
personal data with those contacts that are affected by or involved in it.
A second facet of interpersonal ties is the personal relation between the members and their
individual contacts. However, determining the personal level of interpersonal ties is a complex
endeavor. For example, Gilbert and Karahalios (2009) count the number of intimacy and positive
words on the members’ SNS walls and in their inboxes to address this. Apart from contextspecific sharing of personal data, the interviewees often explained their privacy protection
behavior by comparing ‘close friends’ or ‘friends’ with ‘acquaintances’ or ‘barely known’. Many
interviewees reported to share all of their personal data with close friends or regular friends,
whereas they rather share only selected personal data or no personal data to contacts in a more
distanced relation.
Our collected data shows that the contacts in a close or distanced personal relation with
an SNS member differentiate from one another in the amount of knowledge this member has
about them: “I know much more about my good friends. Maybe I know the 100 most important
things about the life of a good friend but only the ten most important things about an
acquaintance.” (Interviewee Oliver). We acknowledge that the amount of knowledge cannot
alone predict social relationships on SNS. However, having only little personal data available
about a contact (and vice versa: expecting the contact knows only a few things about oneself)
raises the probability that shared personal data will get interpreted in a wrong or unintended way.
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Many interviewees reported to share only a minimum of personal data with these contacts.
Therefore, they apply very restrictive individual privacy settings for those contacts. In opposite,
contacts in a close personal relationship to the SNS member have enough background knowledge
about the latter to be able to interpret his or her personal data appropriately — even if there is no
contextual relation. We therefore conclude:
Proposition 10: SNS members share any kind of personal data with contacts to which they have
a close personal relation. Members share little or selected personal data with contacts with
which they only have a distanced personal relation.
Conceptual Model
Figure 3 depicts a conceptual model, which links all developed concepts using the
propositions as outlined above. It provides an overview of the different concepts that came out to
determine members’ reasons to apply and setup individual privacy settings in a certain way.

Reason to Connect:



Same for all
Specific

Composition of CN:
P1




Small World Network
Groups
Unconnected Groups

Interpersonal Ties:
P8




Contextual Relation
Personal Relation

P2

Level of Activity:



P9, P10

Passive (low)
Active (high)

P4

Inhibitors:




Distrust in Facebook
Doubts in Reliability
Required Effort

P4

Usage of Individual
Privacy Settings to
Avoid Threats of:



Misinterpretation
Misuse

Figure 3. Conceptual Model
Many interviewees reported to have specific reasons to connect with specific contacts in
their network. Thereby, members distinguish between different groups of contacts based on the
reasons that they want to connect and interact with these contacts (P1). Different kinds of reasons
to connect and to interact are associated with different levels of activity. For example, ‘keeping
connected’ as the main motivation to be connected with a contact will probably result in only
sporadic interactions and a low level of activity (i.e. a member merely consuming shared
personal data by their contacts), whereas ‘keeping others informed’ will result in a more active
behavior (e.g. actively sharing personal data) (P2). An overall low level of activity makes it
obsolete to apply individual privacy settings, as this goes along with a low probability of privacy
threats (P3). Choosing an overall low level of activity can be grounded in the fact that SNS
members doubt in the ability to protect their privacy appropriately or with an adequate effort.
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This also indirectly inhibits the usage of individual privacy settings, as no data has to be
protected that could be subject of misuse or misinterpretation (P4).
In general, individual privacy settings allow showing different levels of activity to certain
groups within the network of contacts, thereby avoiding wrong or unintended interpretation of
data (P5). Groups of contacts within a member’s network typically differ in their structure. Small
world network groups are those groups of contacts that are tightly interconnected with one
another. Unconnected groups are those groups of contacts that members can identify, but whose
contacts are not interconnected with one another (P6). Individual privacy settings are configured
based on both of these types of groups. However, these groups affect the way members assign
individual privacy settings. In particular, members tend to avoid differentiating between
members that are part of a small world network group. A reason for this is the potential loss of
social capital (P7).
Whether or not specific personal data or a category of personal data is shared with a
group of contacts depends on the risk that these contacts could misinterpret this personal data or
interpret it in an unintended way. Members share personal data specifically with those contacts
that have a contextual relation to the personal data being shared (P9) or in a closer personal
relation to be able to interpret the shared personal data appropriately (P10).

DISCUSSION
The first part of our analysis provided propositions 1 to 5 as an explanation of why SNS
members use individual privacy settings when being active on an SNS. The second part of our
analysis expanded with propositions 6 to 10 as an explanation on how SNS members use and set
up their individual privacy settings. Both parts of the results are closely related to each other. The
findings have been summarized in a conceptual model (cf. Figure 3).
On a very general level, we conclude that SNS members apply individual privacy settings
to (re-)establish communication patterns with their contacts, comparable to the communication
patterns they have already been pursuing in the offline world (Goffman, 1959; Wellman and
Worteley, 1990). In this regard, we identified and described small world network groups that
SNS members attempt to transfer from the offline world to SNS. While such groups are
genuinely separated from each other in the offline world (e.g., sport club members, colleagues at
work, etc.), it requires individual privacy settings to virtually distinguish between these groups in
an SNS. Furthermore, SNS members distinguish between different kinds of personal
relationships within their network of contacts. Here, most often SNS members restrict access to
their personal data to contacts for whom they only want to share their contact details or for
whom they do not want to reject their connect request. This especially applies to contacts that are
only in weak contextual and personal relation to an SNS member (e.g., ‘acquaintances’, ‘barley
known’).
In the line of future research, Gilbert and Karahalios (2009) have proposed to investigate
the role of privacy controls in order to predict the tie strength between SNS members. Based on
our analysis, we are able to distinguish between four types of contacts, which are determined by
the individual privacy settings of an SNS member (cf. Figure 4): A contact
 has access to everything an SNS member shares (type 1 contact),
 has access to everything but specific context-related personal data (type 2 contact),
 has no access but to specific context-related personal data (type 3 contact) or
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Nothing, but
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Type 4 Contact

Party

Type 3 Contact

Sport

Type 2 Contact

Job

Type 1 Contact

Family

has no or generally limited access to personal data (type 4 contact).

Family



Nothing

Figure 4. . Types of contacts, based on assigned individual privacy settings

Our findings on how members apply individual privacy settings indicate that these
settings can be used to show (on a discrete scale) the differences in tie strength between a
member and different types of his or her contacts. Most likely, type 1 contacts will be in a strong
tie relationship to the member, type 4 contacts will be in a weak tie relationship, whereas type 2
and type 3 contacts of an SNS member might be in-between those two extremes.
Besides these theoretical implications, understanding why and how members use
individual privacy settings on SNS also provides a number of practical implications. Our analysis
has shown that SNS members use individual privacy settings to show different levels of activities
towards different groups of contacts in their network. Our analysis also demonstrated that
mistrust of the reliability of individual privacy settings and their related complexity keeps SNS
members from engaging in a higher level of activity on SNS. In this regard, two out of three
identified inhibiting factors (i.e. the reliability and the configuration effort) indicate design
problems of individual privacy settings, which could and need to be addressed by the platform
provider Facebook. Consequently, our insights on why and how members use individual privacy
settings can be used to guide SNS members in setting up their individual privacy settings, as well
as to help SNS providers in improving existing individual privacy settings design.
In addition to their original purpose of protecting privacy towards connected SNS
members, individual privacy settings might be applicable and useable to other aspects of
members’ SNS activities. An example is filtering information that the members receive from
their contact network, in the case of Facebook via a centralized newsfeed (Chen et al., 2010,
Chen et al., 2011). Literature indicates that this amount of information is large and diverse in
topics, almost resulting in an information overload for SNS members (Borgs et al., 2007;
Koroleva et al., 2010). We noted several times that individual privacy settings are defined on a
contextual basis: family-related, personal data is shared with family; job-related, personal data is
shared with colleagues. This holds especially true for our type 3 contacts (no access but to
specific context-related personal data). This information could be seen as an indication that a
member is particularly interested in receiving contextually related data from those groups.
Thereby, current information filtering systems as Facebook’s edge rank system, which is mainly
based on quantitative research observing SNS members’ activities, could be improved by
incorporating this group information (Backstrom et al., 2010; Bakshy et al., 2012; Taylor, 2011).
Although we claim that our main results can be generalized across any SNS, we have to
disclose and discuss some limitations of our study. The actual importance of the single concepts
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that we have identified might vary depending on the data sample composition. As our informants
are mainly from Western countries, different responses regarding the potential threats originating
from members’ network of contacts are possible for other parts of the world. This might also
affect the importance and relation of the associated categories. For example, we could imagine
that interviewees from countries that do not have a guaranteed freedom of speech would consider
threats of misuse originating in their own contact network or from the provider to be more
important and severe, and even threatening to their lives. Consequently, we do not claim that our
concepts are the only valid or useful ones to examine and explain privacy protection behavior in
non-anonymous online environments such as SNS.

CONCLUSION
From a societal perspective, individuals become increasingly aware of general privacy
threats on SNS and increasingly demand from their providers to protect them from the latter.
Whereas there is no protection towards the SNS service provider, our analysis has shown that the
members will protect their privacy towards their contacts by reducing their level of activity or
abstain from using these services at all. “Real name” initiatives of many SNS (Boyd, 2011),
aspects of profile likability between different online services (Zafarani and Liu, 2009), and the
integration of third party services having access to members’ contact network (Krishnamurty and
Wills, 2009) give rise to the assumption that individual-to-individual privacy protection in nonanonymous online environments will become an even more important research topic. Our
analysis on why and how members use individual privacy settings contributes to this issue. It
turned out that understanding why and how members use individual privacy settings on SNS
might be one of the most complex questions on individuals’ privacy protection behavior to-date.
It raises several complicated and interrelated questions with regard to members’ general attitude
towards privacy, awareness and perception of privacy threats, the motivation to use SNS, and
finally to connect with other SNS members. All these questions are worth answering because an
increasing amount of personal data is shared exclusively within members’ network of contacts.
Our findings provide an empirical and theoretical baseline for improving existing privacy
controls on SNS, for example, by reducing members’ effort to configure such controls.
Moreover, the insights may also help researchers or policy- and decision-makers to better
understand how individuals extend the presentation of themselves in everyday live to nonanonymous online environments. In the first instance, the presented results originate from
Facebook members. However, at the given level of abstraction on the level of categories and
propositions summarized in Figure 1, we claim that our results hold for other SNS as well. This
is supported by the statements of many interviewees and World Café workshop participants who
reported to behave similarly on other SNS they use. Our results can also be transferrable to social
plug-ins for e-mail applications (Fisher et al., 2006; Neustaedter et al., 2005, Yoo et al., 2009),
social recommendation systems (Siersdorfer and Sizov, 2009), or even more privacy-sensitive
online services such as healthcare platforms (e.g., http://www.patientslikeme.com) and electronic
patient records (e.g., http://healthvault.com).
While acknowledging and describing the limitations of our approach in the previous
section, we would not have been able to produce this substantial, innovative insight without
applying grounded theory techniques. Our model aims to provide a theoretical baseline for
subsequent quantitative studies on members’ motivation to use individual privacy settings.
However, the elaborated motives for using individual privacy settings require further
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specification to be transferable into testable hypotheses or design guidelines. Consequently, we
encourage further qualitative and quantitative research in this domain to challenge and to
comment on our insights.
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